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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

TRADE REsTRAINTS--ANTI-TRUST LAws-TYING CoNTRAcTS--RIGHT
OF SE:tECTION OF CusTOMERs--Defendant, one of the country's largest producers of salt for industrial uses, held patents on two machines for utilization
of salt products. It leased these machines on condition that the lessee purchase
from defendant all the salt ( an unpatented product) to be used with the
machines unless salt should become available elsewhere at a lower price. The
federal government brought suit under the Sherman 1 and Clayton 2 Acts to
enjoin the continued observance of these provisions of the lessee. The district
court granted the injunction and ordered t}lat defendant, if offering any
machines at all for lease, offer the same to any and all applicants on nondis-

1
2

26 Stat. L. 209 et seq. (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 1-7.
38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1940) §§12-27.
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cnmmatory terms. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, affirmed. Three justices dissented as to the latter part of the decree. Jn,ternational Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, (U.S. 1947) 68 S.Ct. 12.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act forbids the use of '~tying clauses" (leases or
sales in which the· lessee or purchaser is forbidden to use or sell products of
competitors of the lessor or seller), "where the effect ••• may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 8 Some cases have indicated
that if a tying clause is imposed by a "non-dominant" manufacturer and affects
only a small aimount of trade it does not violate that act. 4 On the other hand,
it has often been said that the amount of trade restrained is .not the test of violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but that the direct and absolute character
of the restraint governs. 5 At least, when the party imposing the tying clause
does a large percentage of the busin~ss in its field, there is clearly a violation
of the Clayton Act. 6 The provision requiring defendant to meet the competitive
price does not save the contract from illegality, for it still leaves the defendant
with a special advantage in this market. Nor does the possession of patents give
the lessor any greater right to impose such conditions, 7 for the act applies to
leases of machinery whether patented or unpatented. 8 The decree appears to
be on weaker ground in requiring defendant to offer the machines to any
applicant. It is usually said that a party in private business "may select his
own customers and . . • may sell or refuse to sell to a customer for good
causes or for no cause whatever." 9 It has also been thought that a patent
holder could withhold his discovery from use entirely, or permit its use only
within narrow limits.10 At least one decision has gone far in the direction of
requiring the holder of patents to license them to all applicants at an equal
3

38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1940) § 14.
Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 43 S.Ct. 450
(1923); B. S. Pearsall Butter Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, {C.C.A. 7th, 1923)
292 F. 720.
5
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 at 485, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 8II (1940).
6 International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. I 31, 56
S.Ct. 701 (1936); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451,
42 S.Ct. 363 (1922); Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C.C.A. 1st, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 952, cert. den., 326 U.S. 776, 66 S.Ct. 267 (1945).
7
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 S.Ct. 9 (1912);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416
(1917). On the relation between the policies of the patent and anti-trust laws, see
generally Wooo, PATENTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAw (1942).
8
38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1940) § 14; Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 136 F. {2d) 339 at 343.
9
Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1941) II7 F. (2d) 53 at
61; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465 (1919); Federal
Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1932) 57 F. {2d)
152.
1° Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 S.Ct.
748 (1908); United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 at 490, 47 S.Ct.
192 (1926); Powell, "The Nature of a Patent Right," 17 CoL. L. REv. 663 (1917).
4
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royalty; 11 and it has been suggested that a system of compulsory licensing would
be both constitutional and desirable.12 Congress, however, has never adopted
such a proposal. 18 While the decree here does not go so far as that, it does invade
the normal right of a trader to select his customers.14 Moreover, it is contrary
to the usual equity rule that the in junction shall be no broader than the wrong
previously done or threatened, as shown by the evidence.15 The majority seems
to consider this form of decree essential to insure complete destruction of the
monopolistic practices. They refer to the desirability of making the decree
specific enough so that the defendant may know exactly what he may and anay
not do, and point out that the district court retained jurisdiction to modify the
decree. Yet it does place defendant under an extra hazard in carrying on its
ordinary business, subjecting it to danger of punishment for contempt for acts
not strictly forbidden by the anti-trust laws. As the dissenting justices point
out, evasion of the decree by the, exercise of the right to select customers could
have been prevented by a less inclusiye decree, for example, by enjoining the
defendant from making its selection on the basis of willingness of prospective
lessees to buy salt from it.

John F. Buchman, III

11 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 419, Q5 S.Ct. 373
(1944); discussed in "Integration of the Anti-Trust and Patent Laws," 45 CoL. L.
REV. 601 (1945).
12 Schechter, "Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be Constitutional?" 22
'VA. L. REV. 287 (1936).
13 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 417, 65 S.Ct. 373
(1944).
14 This right is denied by neither the Sherman or Clayton Acts nor the RobinsonPatman price discrimination act, 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1940) § 13.
It is subject to the qualification that the selection may not be made in circumstances
which give it the effect of an illegal restraint of trade, Federal Trade Commission v.
Beech..:Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S.Ct. 150 (1922); Hills Bros. v. Federal
Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 9th, 1926) 9 F. (2d) 481; ToULMIN, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAws· 240 et seq. (1937); Brown, "The Right to
Refuse to Sell," 25 YALE L. J. 194 (1916). However, the mere refusal to sell raises
no inference of any such restraint, Johnson v: J. H. Yost Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 8th,
1941) II7 F. (2d) 53 at 61.
15 New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200
U.S. 361 at 404, 26 S.Ct. 272 (1906); National Labor Relations Board v. Express
Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 at 435-437, ~1 S.Ct. 693 (1941).

